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– but not in regard to ends (or ‘ultimate values’) – can be tested by social scientific analysis. An 
assessment of  means encourages one to be ‘conscious of  the fact that any action … will have 
consequences that imply taking sides’.16 Those who act ‘responsibly’, Weber wrote, must weigh 
‘the goal of  his action against its consequences’. The question for social scientific judgment, 
then, is whether the ends justify the ‘ultimate’ means.17 The social scientist assumes the ‘duty 
of  creating clarity and a sense of  responsibility’ about the consequences that follow from pre-
scribed actions.18 It follows that there is a scholarly responsibility to evaluate the contending 
sides to an argument and, where evidence leans clearly in one direction and not in another, to 
say as much.
It is not enough, then, merely to describe debates when the contending sides have better or 
worse arguments. The authors appeal to the fact that there are (to borrow from Weber again) 
gods forever warring over the terms of  investment law that are irreconcilable and, therefore, 
incapable of  being placated by scholarly research. They dutifully, if  inconsistently, decline to 
choose which, among those gods, to serve.19 Yet the authors also have a responsibility to clarify, 
rather than relativize, these clashing positions in so far as they have empirically verifiable evi-
dence in their support. If  Political Economy admirably succeeds at acknowledging those contend-
ing views, the book sometimes falls short of  providing guidance about which arguments, in 
support of  those views, is more compelling than others.
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16 Weber, ‘The “Objectivity” of  Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy’, in H.H. Bruun and 
S.  Whimster (eds), Max Weber: Complete Methodological Writings (2010) 100, at 102 (emphasis in 
original).
17 Weber, ‘Science as a Profession and Vocation’, in Bruun and Whimster, supra note 16, 335, at 350. Those 
ultimate values were, however, ‘cultural questions’ that were ‘less amenable’ to ‘unambiguous solution’ 
in Weber, supra note 16, at 104.
18 Weber, supra note 17, at 350. On the ethic of  responsibility in scholarly pursuits, see the fleeting refer-
ence in Weber ‘The Profession and Vocation of  Politics’, in P. Lassman and R. Speirs (eds), Weber: Political 
Writings (1994) 309, at 360, and discussion about the responsibility of  all ‘human action’ in K. Löwith, 
Max Weber and Karl Marx, translated by Hans Fantel (1982), at 46–47.
19 Weber, supra note 17; Weber, ‘Between Two Laws’, in Lassman and Speirs, supra note 18, 75, at 79.
José E. Alvarez, The Impact of  International Organizations on International 
Law. Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2017. Pp. 479. ISBN: 9789004328457.
Any book authored by José E. Alvarez is a must-read for an international lawyer interested not 
only in international organizations (IOs) but also in the way international law works today. 
And this one is no different. The Impact of  International Organizations on International Law may 
be read as an updated and refined restatement of  Alvarez’s position on ‘how institutional-
ization has affected the making, the interpretation, the contents, and the effect of  interna-
tional law’ (at vii). It is a topic he first explored in his 2005 book International Organizations as 
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Law-Makers and one he has been teaching since 1989.1 This new monograph is based on the 
general course Alvarez gave at the Xiamen Academy of  International Law in 2013. It extends 
to the reader the unique benefits of  having grown out of  a teaching exercise. This is the case, 
in particular, with respect to the selection of  the material that is covered in 423 pages and to 
the complexity reduction that necessarily comes with having to convey a clear message about 
a nebulous set of  practices.
The book presents itself  as being concerned with ‘the future of  international law’ and iden-
tifies the ‘challenges’ IOs pose to ‘legal positivism’, ‘traditional conceptions of  sovereignty’ 
and ‘the rule of  law itself ’ (at back cover). The reader will not be disappointed. The mono-
graph, written in Alvarez’s characteristic style, is riveting in its argument and extremely rich 
and nuanced in the information it processes. The argument unfolds in six chapters. The first 
presents what Alvarez sees as ‘the most dominant framework for understanding international 
law’ (at 47) – that is, legal positivism – and what he depicts as the ‘institutional challenge’ to 
that framework. The sixth, and concluding, chapter revisits and refines that challenge as the 
first challenge posed by IOs (at 345), before adding two more: the ‘IO challenge to sovereignty’ 
(at 385) and the ‘IO challenge to the rule of  law’ (at 398). The other four chapters cover exam-
ples of  IOs’ impact on international law: the second and third chapters pertain to law-making 
by the United Nations (UN) and, in particular, the UN Security Council in Chapter 2 and the 
UN General Assembly in Chapter 3; the fourth chapter focuses on law-making by a specialized 
agency, the World Health Organization; and the fifth chapter addresses international adjudi-
cation in a generic fashion.
The book’s argument revolves around what it refers to as the ‘institutional challenge to 
[legal] positivism’ (at 18, 345). Alvarez contends that ‘the law-making activities’ of  IOs ‘cast 
doubt on propositions that international law is established only on the basis of  the consent 
of  states, emerges only from the three sources of  obligation contained in Article 38 of  the 
International Court of  Justice Statute, can be easily distinguished on the basis of  its clearly 
binding authority, and can be understood without the need to draw on non-legal disciplines’ 
(at 345). Instead, according to Alvarez, understanding international law requires ‘drawing 
on the insights of  those who study institutions’ and bureaucracies (at 345), both domes-
tically and globally (at 346). Being attentive to ‘institutionally generated law’ in this way 
should enable one, Alvarez argues, ‘to consider the characteristics of  the law produced by 
these institutions, rather than beginning with a preconceived idea of  what those obligations 
need to be and then attempting to fit the complex legal products of  contemporary IOs within 
it’ (at 346–347).
Interestingly, the book also introduces important nuances and caveats to this argument at 
the end of  Chapter 1 (at 45–52) and reiterates them at the end of  Chapter 6 (at 422–423). 
In this concluding section, Alvarez emphasizes two ‘contradictory aspects of  the age of  IOs’. 
On the one hand, states are transformed by IOs, including with respect to their sovereignty, 
but they are ‘hardly displaced as primary law-making actors’ (at 385). On the other hand, 
even if  certain IOs purport to promote the rule of  law, their bureaucracies also ‘pose formi-
dable challenges to it’ (at 398, 409). Drawing on these tensions, the book concludes with a 
much more modest claim than the one it started with. Alvarez’s opening line of  argument 
was that IO law is law (without quotation marks) and that dominant international legal 
theories cannot account for it (at 1, 345–347). Instead, in the book’s conclusion, and in 
a more cautious tone, Alvarez actually calls on ‘international law scholars’ to ‘provid[e] a 
satisfactory and widely accepted test for determining when informal processes [such as IOs] 
1 J.E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2005).
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produce something worthy of  being called (and treated as) “international law” [with quota-
tion marks]’ (at 423). This, Alvarez continues, would then make it possible for authors like 
him to convince people ‘that the “law” produced by IOs is effective and that IOs can be held 
“accountable”’ (at 423).
I have learned a lot from reading the book. My concerns about its thesis are mainly of  a theo-
retical kind and pertain to two issues: first, the framing of  the book’s argument and, second, the 
conception of  legal theory underpinning it. The critique to come should be read as a tribute to 
the quality of  the book and to the urgency of  the questions it raises for the institutional future 
of  international law. 
First of  all, the book sets out to address the ‘impact’ of  ‘institutionalization’ (or ‘IOs’, as both 
are used interchangeably [at 44, 47, 345,  352]) on ‘international law’ (book title). Its start-
ing point is that ‘institutionalization’/‘IOs’ and ‘international law’ are separate concepts. This 
framing affects not only the book’s analysis of  the various challenges IOs pose to international 
law but also the proposals it makes to address it. Part of  the problem Alvarez (rightly) wants to 
tackle, indeed, is the alleged lack of  institutional concern on the part of  (most) international 
lawyers (and international legal theorists). The difficulty, however, is that this very disconnect 
between law and institutions actually also underlies the general framework he uses to approach 
international law in the book and that he thereby perpetuates (at 19–20).
Contrasting and opposing international law (or ‘rules’ [at 3–4, 36] made by states) and inter-
national institutions (epitomized by IOs [at 345]) in this way raises two problems. It curiously 
assumes that, first, states are not institutions of  and for international law and that, second, insti-
tutions like IOs are not made of  international law and dependent upon it. Starting with the 
latter, on the one hand, international law rules and institutions (including states and IOs) are 
intimately related. It has become increasingly difficult to conceive of  either of  them without the 
other; while it is, strictly speaking, possible to think of  institutions that are not law-based and 
of  laws that are not institution-related, modern (domestic and international) law (qua states’ 
law), at least in the Western tradition, is institutional, and modern (domestic and international) 
institutions (qua states or state-based institutions) are legal.2 This makes any attempt at delineat-
ing the ‘impact’ of  IOs on international law from the reverse question of  the international legal 
constitution of  IOs naive. Addressing the former relation without the latter would therefore nec-
essarily be incomplete.3 As a matter of  fact, many contemporary (domestic and international) 
legal theorists, including the legal positivists whom Alvarez criticizes, have long emphasized the 
institutional dimension of  legal norms in their legal theory and the complexity this generates for 
theorizing (domestic and international) institutions separately from the laws that make them 
and which they make in return.4
As for the institutional nature of  states in international law, on the other hand, it is often 
overlooked by international lawyers working on IOs, including Alvarez.5 This is surprising to 
2 This may explain why Alvarez restricts the scope of  his institutional argument to international organiza-
tions (IOs) that are ‘inter-state’ (at 28, 47) and can therefore be related back to states institutionally. He 
does not clearly justify that choice, however, and seems to want to keep all options open regarding the 
international law-making role of  other ‘non-state entities’ (at 28–29).
3 For an attempt to embrace both international law and institutions at the same time, see, e.g., Besson 
and Martí, ‘The Legitimate Actors of  International Law-Making: Towards a Theory of  International 
Democratic Representation’, 9 Jurisprudence (2018) 504.
4 See, e.g., albeit in different ways, Raz, ‘Why the State?’, in N. Roughan and A. Halpin (eds), In Pursuit of  
Pluralist Jurisprudence (2017) 136; MacCormick, ‘The Legal Framework: Institutional Normative Order’, 
in Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (1999) 1; R. Collins, The 
Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (2016); A.  von Bogdandy et  al. (eds), The Exercise of  
Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law (2010).
5 For an exception, see, e.g., P. Reuter, Institutions internationales (1963), at 103ff.
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the extent that what underpins most controversies pertaining to IOs in international law today 
is the latter’s (legal and institutional) relationship to (member, but especially third) states. 
Functionalism (for example, at 351 and in Chapter 5) has famously been blamed for preventing 
international lawyers from addressing how IOs relate to states other than their member states.6 
It also obfuscates, therefore, how IOs may be said to contribute to the making of  general inter-
national law, both as general international lawmakers and as general international legal sub-
jects. Uncovering the legal and institutional relationship between states and IOs could therefore 
help to deal with many of  the questions discussed later in the book such as the sovereignty and 
rule-of-law challenges that Alvarez claims are posed by IOs. Nowhere, however, is the state–IO 
institutional relationship addressed as such in the book (or only at the very end and solely in 
terms of  ‘powers’ [at 422]).
An explanation for Alvarez’s conceptual separation between international law and institu-
tions and between states and IOs may be that, like other international lawyers, he relies too heav-
ily on the economic and technical notion of  (global) ‘governance’ (at 21) (instead, for example, 
of  government) when describing the ‘reality’ of  international ‘institutionalization’ (at 19–29).7 
However, neither does he state what governance actually amounts to or how governance ties in 
with all of  the international institutions we have, including states and IOs. As a matter of  fact, 
there are so many conceptions of  ‘governance’ available in the literature cited by Alvarez that it 
is difficult at times to follow what it refers to, especially with respect to international law-making 
(at 19–29). The term applies interchangeably to all kinds of  IOs and international institutions 
like ICs, and is used, for instance, to mean ‘political impact’ (at 21), ‘autonomous normative 
action that has an impact on how states or international organisations regulate themselves’ (at 
311), but also simply ‘law-making’ (at 285), thereby seemingly contradicting the opposition 
between international courts’ (ICs) ‘law-making functions’ and ‘governing functions’ made in 
Chapter 5. Generally, I fear that the notion may have become a distraction in the field of  inter-
national institutional law. It has become a placeholder that keeps international lawyers from 
taking international institutions as seriously as Alvarez rightly claims we should. Ultimately, 
perhaps, relying on the notion of  global governance may have served to make the book as 
blind to the institutional dimension of  all forms of  (international) law as the legal positivists it 
(wrongly) blames for it.
The second, albeit related, matter I would like to take issue with is the book’s approach to legal 
theory. One would expect a book dedicated to (changes in) international law-making to rely on 
a solid legal theory – just as one would expect it to have a good theory of  what international 
institutions amount to, as I explained before. Instead, what the book does is sketch, and then 
criticize, what it takes to be the most influential international legal theory – that is to say, legal 
positivism – but without providing an alternative one. Not only is the description of  legal positiv-
ism caricatural and, as result, not as dominant as claimed, but the absence of  any alternative 
also leaves a big gap in the argument.
With respect to the book’s critique of  ‘legal positivism’ (at 1), one may not exclude that some 
legal positivists could defend some of  the four tenets of  legal positivism (the ‘ideal type’ [at 8]) 
identified by Alvarez: consent-based legal validity; separation between law and morality; source-
based scientific reasoning; and closed-off  systematicity (at 1, 2–17). It is clear, however, that 
they need not do so to be qualified as legal positivists and vice-versa. Of  course, this may simply 
be a matter of  how those tenets are described by Alvarez, and he actually concedes as much (at 
18–19). However, I fear that it may not be that beneficial to the debate to frame what one sees as 
6 See, e.g., J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organizations Law (3rd edn, 2015), at 2–6.
7 For a discussion, see, e.g., A. Supiot, Homo juridicus: Essai sur la fonction anthropologique du Droit (2005), 
at 227.
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the ‘dominant framework for understanding public international law’ (at 47) in a way that no 
one is defending as such and then to identify challenges to a straw man. Worse, that straw man 
is not only referred to as a ‘positivist’ but sometimes also as a ‘traditional positivist’, with tradi-
tion being flagged as the ultimate faux pas but without much of  an explanation for this pejorative 
assessment of  tradition (at 358).
Most importantly, the book does not offer any alternative to the (caricature of) legal pos-
itivism that it attacks. Instead, it calls on other international lawyers to provide such an 
alternative (at 423). It is difficult to understand, however, how the book could discuss ‘insti-
tutionally generated law’ (at 346)  without, at the same time, developing a corresponding 
concept of  law. Tellingly, the first part of  the book resorts to the terms ‘law’ or ‘legal’ without 
quotation marks and progressively applies those marks to them as it moves forward (contrast, 
for example, 28, 47, 345 with 415–416, 421–423; see also the reference to ‘de facto law-
makers’ [at 394]).
Of  course, Alvarez may claim that all he wants to do is reveal the IO challenge to his under-
standing of  the dominant international legal theory, without venturing proposals as to how to fix 
it (at 18–19). However, even that claim fails to convince. The book opposes ‘theory’ (epit omized 
by legal positivism) with ‘reality’ (epitomized by IOs or ‘institutionalization’ more broadly) (at 8, 
19, 370). The problem is that such a stark opposition between theory and reality is difficult to 
accept with respect to a normative practice and especially an institutional one such as law. There 
is no good theory of  law that would not aim at being part of  the law as it is practised normatively 
and institutionally. Conversely, there is no good normative and institutional practice of  law that 
does not come with a legal theory thereof. International law is no exception in this respect.8 If  
certain features of  international law are reflected in international law theory, positivist or not, it 
is because they are in practice and vice-versa (at 420).
As a result, and contrary to what Alvarez appears to think (at 346–347, 409–410), few 
international legal theorists would claim that it is possible or desirable to begin with a pre-
conceived idea of  what legal obligations need to be and then attempt to fit the complex legal 
products of  contemporary IOs within it. However, it would be equally misguided on the part of  
an institutional legal theorist of  the kind advocated by Alvarez to assume, conversely, that she 
should first gather the facts about IO law and then provide a legal theory of  those facts (at 423). 
(International) law is not merely a set of  natural facts against which a theory can be tested. It is 
odd, therefore, to consider, like Alvarez, that one may describe a certain legal practice without 
expressing at the same time some form of  normative assessment of  that practice as a participant 
in that practice (at 48). The ‘theoretical’ and the ‘real’ go hand in hand in the normative practice 
of  international law. Contrary to what the book argues, legal theory simply cannot provide a 
‘test for determining when informal processes [such as IOs] produce something worthy of  being 
called (and treated as) “international law”’ (at 423).
Neglect of  this strong and mutual connection between theory and practice in international 
law may explain why the book concludes by seemingly reverting to a position it had ruled out 
at the outset of  the enquiry. By concluding that the international norms produced by IOs may 
not after all be of  a legal kind (at 409–410, 412), the book seems to end where it should have 
started; it begs the question of  the international institutional legal theory it needed to present 
and discuss the practice of  international law qua law.
The theoretical concerns expressed in this review do not detract from the quality of  the survey 
and assessment of  the current institutional practice of  international law offered in the book. 
As always, Alvarez captures very astutely the state of  the debate about IOs and how they may 
8 See Besson, ‘International Legal Theory qua Practice of  International Law’, in J.  d’Aspremont, 
A. Nollkaemper and T. Gazzini (eds), International Law as a Profession (2017) 268.
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or may not be said to contribute to international law-making. International lawyers should all 
respond to the book’s call for future research. We urgently need an international legal theory 
that accounts for (all) international institutions and their practice.
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Email: samantha.besson@unifr.ch
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Juan Pablo Scarfi. The Hidden History of  International Law in the Americas: 
Empire and Legal Networks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 239. £64. 
ISBN: 9780190622343.
Juan Pablo Scarfi ’s The Hidden History of  International Law in the Americas is part dual legal biog-
raphy of  James Brown Scott and Alejandro Alvarez, part institutional history of  the American 
Institute of  International Law (AIIL) – the organization they created with the financial support 
of  the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) – and part exploration of  ‘American 
international law’, a set of  ideas principally set forth by Scott and Alvarez through the AIIL. 
These ideas justified US imperialism and interventionism in the Americas (particularly in 
Cuba) as part of  a larger pan-American project that spanned from the late 19th century into 
the 1930s, and they became operational through ‘legal and diplomatic networks of  hegemonic 
interactions in the Americas’ that were facilitated by the AIIL (at xviii). It is to this network and 
particularly to the ‘unveiling’ of  American international law’s underlying ‘ethnocentric, elitist, 
missionary, and hegemonic’ beliefs and ‘civilizing imperial aspirations’ that the title’s adjective 
‘hidden’ refers (at 188).
Scarfi ’s story, though, begins with the focus not on Scott and Alvarez or the AIIL but, rather, 
on Elihu Root. Root and the pan-Americanism he promoted sought to maintain and extend US 
economic leadership in the Americas. A hegemony based on consent, founded on notions of  
‘shared hemispheric histories, institutions, and ideals’ and codified by rules, pan-Americanism 
promoted continental solidarity, the international rule of  law, the peaceful settlement of  dis-
putes through judicial mechanisms, sovereign equality and the codification of  international law 
(at 3, 21). As secretary of  state, Root (who as secretary of  war had previously drafted much of  
what would be called the Platt Amendment) advocated these beliefs during his 1906 tour of  
South America and particularly at the third Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro. That 
same year, the American Society of  International Law was founded, with Root as its inaugural 
president and Scott as a founder. By 1910, so too was the CEIP, also with Root (now a US sena-
tor) as its first president and with Scott (who had previously served as solicitor to Root at the 
Department of  State) as general secretary and director of  the International Law Division.
The year before, Scott and Alvarez, a Chilean lawyer and foreign ministry adviser, had 
met. Alvarez had independently already begun to think explicitly about an American inter-
national law, distinctive from the European version. (The term itself  originated in 1844 with 
Juan Bautista Alberdi, though it seems without much consequence at the time.) Alvarez would 
publish his ideas as a 1909 article in the American Journal of  International Law, of  which Scott 
was editor-in-chief, and, the following year, as a book, Le droit international américain: Son fonde-
ment, sa nature.1 Together in 1911, Scott and Alvarez proposed to Root the establishment of  the 
AIIL, a western hemisphere counterpart to the Institut de droit international. The organization 
1 A. Alvarez, Le droit international américain: Son fondement, sa nature (1910).
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